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Abstract 
This paper attempts, on the one hand, to reveal the main principles of Competition Law (regulatory 
and case law framework) covering the prevention of parallel trade, mainly the prohibition of 
parallel imports or exports, and on the other hand to cast light on the main effects of parallel 
imports prohibition imposed by an upstream supplier on the competitive structure of the 
downstream market. Especially, the regulatory framework relates Block Exception Regulation 
330/2010, (ex Block Exception Regulation 2790/99), with Block Exception Regulation 461/2010 
(ex Block Exception Regulation 1400/2002) in order to determine whether prohibition of parallel 
trade constitutes a hardcore restriction or not, while the economic analysis evaluates it in a 
geographical vertical market which constitutes an upstream and a downstream market with few 
suppliers & buyers respectively which sell goods to the final (domestic) consumers. The results 
indicate that prohibition of parallel imports by the upstream sellers causes vertical restraints to the 
domestic customers of the buyers. 
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1. Introduction  
Block Exception Regulation (BER) 330/20101 (ex BER 2790/992) states that article 
101(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to vertical agreements, wheatears such 
agreements contain vertical restraints (ar.2) and the market share held by the 
supplier does not exceed 30 % of the relevant market on which it sells the contract 
goods or services and the market share held by the buyer does not exceed 30 % of 
the relevant market on which it purchases the contract goods or services (ar. 3). 
Also, BER 461/20103 (ex BER1400/20024) declares that article 101(1) of the 
Treaty shall not apply to vertical agreements relating to the conditions under 
which the parties may purchase, sell or resell spare parts for motor vehicles or 
provide repair and maintenance services for motor vehicles, which fulfil the 
requirements for an exemption under Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 and do not 
contain any of the hardcore clauses listed in Article 5 of this Regulation, (see 
below) whereas such agreements contain vertical restraints (article 4).  
However, both BERs contain hardcore restrictions that remove the benefit of the 
block exemption. Especially, article 4 of BER 330/2010 (see below) outlines the 
basic categories of hardcore restrictions, for which the exception provided for in 
the abovementioned article 2 of BER shall not apply to vertical agreements.  
The main question which this paper tries to answer is whether prohibition of 
parallel trade (i.e. of imports or exports or both of them)5 constitutes a hardcore 
restriction of BER for vertical agreements, that is a per se approach. For that 
purpose, we analyse the existing regulatory framework in combination with case 
law into real economic environment so as to determine if prohibition of parallel 
                                                 
1
 O.J. L102/1, 23.4.2010.  
2
 O.J. L336/21, 29.12.1999. 
3
 O.J. L 123C/52, 28.05.2010.  
4
 O.J. L 203/30, 1.8.2002.  
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imports by upstream suppliers may cause vertical restraints in the downstream 
market and especially the customers of the buyers6.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides and 
evaluates the main principles of BER 330/2010 & BER 461/2010. Section 3 
combines both BERs, while section 4 highlights some administrative anticompe-
titive measures. Section 5 imports the theoretical argument into real economic 
environment. Lastly, sections 6 and 7 provide some conclusions and policy 
implications respectively. 
 
2. The content of the BERs 
2.1 Hard core restrictions of BER 330/2010 
Logically, it would be expected that the prohibition of parallel imports would be 
explicitly referred as a hardcore restriction in the content of article 4 of BER 
330/20 (‘Restrictions that remove the benefit of the block exemption — hardcore 
restrictions’). According to that, “The exemption provided for in Article 2 shall 
not apply to vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in 
combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their 
object: 
(a) the restriction of the buyer's ability to determine its sale price, without 
prejudice to the possibility of the supplier to impose a maximum sale price or 
recommend a sale price, provided that they do not amount to a fixed or 
minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any 
of the parties;  
                                                                                                                                     
5
 In this paper parallel trade, imports, exports and parallel imports & exports are used interchan-
geably.  
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(b) the restriction of the territory into which, or of the customers to whom, a 
buyer party to the agreement, without prejudice to a restriction on its place of 
establishment, may sell the contract goods or services7,  
(c) the restriction of active or passive sales to end users by members of a 
selective distribution system operating at the retail level of trade, without 
prejudice to the possibility of prohibiting a member of the system from 
operating out of an unauthorised place of establishment;  
(d) the restriction of cross-supplies between distributors within a selective 
distribution system, including between distributors operating at different level 
of trade;  
(e) the restriction, agreed between a supplier of components and a buyer who 
incorporates those components, of the supplier’s ability to sell the components 
as spare parts to end-users or to repairers or other service providers not 
entrusted by the buyer with the repair or servicing of its goods”8. 
It is obvious that there is no specific provision of the prohibition of parallel 
imports as a hardcore restriction. Consequently, according to the basic principle 
governing BER 330/2010 (as well as the former BER 2790/99), which provides 
that whatever is not prohibited by article 4 is permitted9, it would be expected 
that the prohibition of parallel imports is not a hardcore restriction.  
                                                                                                                                     
6
 According to BER 330/2010, 1(i), ‘customer of the buyer’ means an undertaking not party to the 
agreement which purchases the contract goods or services from a buyer which is party to the 
agreement.’ 
7
 Except from (i) the restriction of active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive 
customer group reserved to the supplier or allocated by the supplier to another buyer, where such 
a restriction does not limit sales by the customers of the buyer, (ii) the restriction of sales to end 
users by a buyer operating at the wholesale level of trade, (iii) the restriction of sales by the 
members of a selective distribution system to unauthorised distributors within the territory 
reserved by the supplier to operate that system, and (iv) the restriction of the buyer's ability to sell 
components, supplied for the purposes of incorporation, to customers who would use them to 
manufacture the same type of goods as those produced by the supplier”. 
8
 See O.J. L102/1, 23.4.2010, p. 5. 
9
 See Dethmers F. & Posthuma de Boer P. (2009) p. 425. 
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However, the significance of the parallel trade protection is mentioned in the new 
Guidelines about vertical restraints10, mainly in paragraph 25, where it is referred 
as an instance that “if after a supplier's announcement of a unilateral reduction of 
supplies in order to prevent parallel trade, distributors reduce immediately their 
orders and stop engaging in parallel trade, then those distributors tacitly 
acquiesce to the supplier's unilateral policy. This can however not be concluded if 
the distributors continue to engage in parallel trade or try to find new ways to 
engage in parallel trade”11.  
In any case, in our view, before someone come to a conclusion whether the 
prohibition of parallel trade constitutes a hardcore restriction or not, it would be 
plausible to examine mainly the following issues: firstly, the necessity of focusing 
on the interpretation of article’s 4 content of the Block Exemption 330/2010 and 
the consideration of the guidelines about vertical restraints in combination with 
the content of Regulation 461/2010 and its relevant guidelines. Secondly, the 
possibility that such a point of view would come in contradiction with the settled 
case law about parallel imports and thirdly, the characteristics of the markets in 
which parallel trade prohibition is imposed. 
2.2 Prohibition of parallel imports as an effective measure for RPM 
The hardcore restriction set out in article 4(a) of the BER 330/2010 focuses on 
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), that is, agreements or concerted practices 
having as their direct or indirect object the establishment of a fixed or minimum 
resale price or a fixed or minimum price level to be observed by the buyer. In the 
case of contractual provisions or concerted practices that directly establish the 
resale price, the restriction is clear cut.  
                                                 
10
 O.J. C130/01, 19.05.2010. 
11
 See para. 25 (a). 
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However, RPM can also be achieved through indirect means. Examples of that are 
an agreement fixing the distribution margin, fixing the maximum level of discount 
the distributor can grant from a prescribed price level, making the grant of rebates 
or reimbursement of promotional costs by the supplier subject to the observance 
of a given price level, linking the prescribed resale price to the resale prices of 
competitors, threats, intimidation, warnings, penalties, delay or suspension of 
deliveries or contract terminations in relation to observance of a given price level. 
Direct or indirect means of achieving price fixing can be made more effective 
when combined with measures to identify price-cutting distributors, such as the 
implementation of a price monitoring system, or the obligation on retailers to 
report other members of the distribution network that deviate from the standard 
price level.  
Similarly, direct or indirect price fixing can be made more effective when 
combined with measures which may reduce the buyer's incentive to lower the 
resale price, such as the supplier printing a recommended resale price on the 
product or the supplier obliging the buyer to apply a most-favoured-customer 
clause. The same indirect means and the same "supportive" measures can be used 
to make maximum or recommended prices work as RPM.  
However, the use of a particular supportive measure or the provision of a list of 
recommended prices or maximum prices by the supplier to the buyer is not 
considered in itself as RPM12. Nevertheless, it should also be assessed that in few 
cases13, maximum and recommended prices will work as a focal point for the 
resellers and might be followed by most or all of them; in such a case the possible 
                                                 
12
 See O.J. L102/1, 23.4.2010, para. 48. 
13
 See O.J. L102/1, 23.4.2010, para 227.  
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competition risk is that maximum or recommended prices may soften competition 
or even facilitate collusion between suppliers. 
The strategy of parallel imports’ prohibition may be seen as a measure which 
reduces the buyer’s incentive to reduce resale price by diminishing the sources of 
supply. Such a strategy may raises dangerously the level of selling prices of the 
products in question, since the elimination of sources of supply restricts the ability 
of the buyer to distribute the product in a profitable way. As a consequence of 
that, the consumer welfare is negatively influenced.  
The consumer welfare may also be negatively influenced in cases where the 
abovementioned strategy takes place in markets where the buyers resell the 
products in question to domestic customers of the buyers. To our view, such a 
product market example may have more severe anticompetitive effects since the 
buyers of the downstream market are not export oriented firms. 
Lastly, by imposing a price floor, an upstream firm increases the non-cooperative 
profits of downstream firms and makes collusion relatively less profitable. As a 
result, collusion may be destabilized and the price floor enables a manufacturer to 
prevent collusive behavior among downstream firms (Overvest B 2010).  
2.3 The argument of exclusive supply of a specific trademark by itself 
Hypothetically speaking, if someone is in favour of the opinion that the 
prohibition of parallel imports is not a hardcore restriction, he could argue that, 
since the prohibition of parallel imports seem to have the same results with an 
exclusive supply agreement, therefore de facto constitutes an exclusive supply.  
Nevertheless, at this point an absolutely necessary distinction ought to be made: 
the exclusive supply of specific products of a trademark is not the same with the 
exclusive supply of a specific trademark by itself; in the first case, the exclusive 
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supply of specific products of a specific trademark is legal, since it does not 
prohibit the parallel imports of these products of the same trademark; If a retailer 
can find the same products of the same trademark by a cheaper source of supply 
(for instance, a wholesaler or an authorized dealer in an other member state), he 
can buy them in order to resale them without breaking the exclusive supply 
agreement.  
On the contrary, the exclusive supply of a specific trademark by itself, which 
actually constitutes exclusive source of supply14 and not exclusive supply, should 
be treated in a completely different way, because it de facto constitutes an indirect 
(but effective) prohibition of parallel imports; in this case, the real purpose of the 
exclusive supply agreement concerning not specific products but a trademark as a 
whole is not a non compete obligation15, but to prevent the retailer from finding 
products of the same trademark in lower prices by other sources. So, the point of 
view that prohibition of parallel imports constitutes an exclusive supply 
agreement and therefore ought to be allowed as a practice is postponed; an 
exclusive supply agreement which indirectly prevent parallel imports is always 
illegal.  
                                                 
14
 Exclusive sourcing is something different, since in this case the existence of exclusive 
distributors is demanded; according to para 162 of the Guidelines on vertical restraints [O.J. 
C130/01, 19.05.2010], “[e]xclusive sourcing, requiring the exclusive distributors to buy their 
supplies for the particular brand directly from the manufacturer, eliminates in addition possible 
arbitrage by the exclusive distributors, which are prevented from buying from other distributors in 
the system”. 
15
 See D.G. Goyder (2004), p. 187. See also para 129 of the Guidelines on vertical agreements 
[O.J. L102/1, 23.4.2010] referring that: “Under the heading of ‘single branding’ fall those 
agreements which have as their main element the fact that the buyer is obliged or induced to 
concentrate its orders for a particular type of product with one supplier. That component can be 
found amongst others in non- compete and quantity-forcing on the buyer. A non- compete 
arrangement is based on an obligation or incentive scheme which makes the buyer purchase more 
than 80% of its requirements on a particular market from only one supplier. It does not mean that 
the buyer can only buy directly from the supplier, but that the buyer will not buy and resell or 
incorporate competing goods or services” [emphasis added].  
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2.4 BER 461/2010 
2.4.1 The content of supplementary guidelines 
The necessity for protection of parallel trade in the motor vehicles sector is 
formulated absolutely clearly in the Commission notice — Supplementary 
guidelines16 on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor 
vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles17,18. The 
Commission considers the protection of parallel trade in the motor vehicles sector 
as an important competition objective, since the internal market has enabled 
consumers to purchase motor vehicles in other Member States and take advantage 
of price differentials between them19. 
The main concept of the internal market is the consumer's ability to buy goods in 
other Member States. This ability is especially important as far as motor vehicles 
are concerned, given the high value of the goods and the direct benefits in the 
form of lower prices accruing to consumers buying motor vehicles elsewhere in 
the Union. It cannot be ignored that the specific nature20 of the motor vehicle 
ought to be taken into account, since it is about one of the most complex 
products21. The Commission is therefore concerned that distribution agreements, 
generally but also specifically in this particular sector, should not restrict parallel 
trade, since this cannot be expected to satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 
                                                 
16
 O.J. C138, 28.05.2010, p. 0016 – 0027. 
17
 See Clark J. and Simon S., (2010), pp. 1-13 and Simon S., (2010), pp. 83-91. 
18
 The new guidelines about the motor vehicle sector are called “supplementary”, since they should 
be read combined with the guidelines on vertical agreements. According to J. Clark and S. Simon, 
(2010), p. 3, “[t]he guidelines carry the word supplementary in their title to signal that they have 
to be read in conjunction with the General Vertical Guidelines”. 
19
 O.J. C138, 28.05.2010, para 48. 
20
 See Karydis G. and Zevgolis N., (2009), p.95. 
21
 As Goyder D.G., (2004), p.203 has mentioned: ‘‘The motor car is probably the most complex 
consumer product of all, as well as being the most expensive purchase that many consumers ever 
make’’. See also Vezzoso S., (2004), p.190-191 who wrote: ‘‘The whole concept was centred on 
the belief that the car was not an ordinary good’’. 
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101(3) of the Treaty22. In the same concept, it is remarkable that the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in its C-338/00P (Volkswagen/Commission) decision 
clearly ruled that “[…] a measure which is liable to partition the market between 
Member States cannot come under those provisions of Regulation No 123/85 that 
deal with the obligations which a distributor may lawfully assume under a 
dealership contract. The Court of First Instance properly held in paragraph 49 of 
the judgment under appeal that, although that regulation provided manufacturers 
with substantial means by which to protect their distribution systems, it did not 
authorise them to adopt measures which contributed to a partitioning of the 
market (Bayerische Motorenwerke, cited above, paragraph 37)”23. So, the 
application of a BER 461/2010 should never be used as an excuse for the 
partitioning of the market. Besides, compartmentalisation of the market is not 
included (and cannot be included) in the purposes of a Block Exemption 
Regulation. 
2.4.2 Case law in motor vehicle sector 
The relevant case law can safely be considered as settled, since the Commission 
has brought several cases against motor vehicle manufacturers for impeding 
parallel trade, and its decisions have been largely confirmed by the European 
Courts24. This experience shows that restrictions on parallel trade may take a 
number of forms (direct or indirect)25,26: a supplier may put pressure on 
distributors, threaten them with contract termination, fail to pay bonuses, refuse to 
                                                 
22
 The notion that cross-border trade restrictions may harm consumers has been confirmed by the 
Court in Case C-551/03 P, para 67 and 68; Case C-338/00 P, para 44 and 49 and Case T-450/05, 
para 46-49. 
23
 O.J. C138, 28.05.2010, para 49. 
24
 See Case IV/35.733 — VW, Case COMP/36.653 — Opel, Case COMP/36.264, Cases F-
2/36.623/36.820/37.275. 
25
 O.J. C138, 28.05.2010, para 49. 
26
 See indicatively Bellamy C. and Child G., (2001), para. 7-053. See also Korah V. & O’Sullivan 
D., (2002), p. 58.  
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honour warranties on motor vehicles imported by a consumer or cross-supplied 
between distributors established in different Member States, or make a distributor 
wait significantly longer for delivery of an identical motor vehicle when the 
consumer in question is resident in another Member State. The relative remarks of 
Advocate General Antonio Tizzano in the General Motors case (C-551/03P) are 
very characteristic. According to his view, “ […] such an objective 
[compartmentalisation of the single market27] can be achieved not only by direct 
restrictions on exports but also through indirect measures aimed at deterring a 
dealer from making foreign sales, particularly by influencing the economic and 
financial conditions of such operations. The Court of Justice has thus regarded as 
inherently restrictive of competition measures which, like the measure at issue 
here, ‘make parallel imports more difficult’28 by subjecting them to treatment less 
favourable than that reserved for official imports or ‘restricting the buyer’s 
freedom to use the goods supplied in accordance with his own economic 
interests’ 29,30”. His point of view had been accepted by the ECJ31. 
 The case where a distributor is unable to obtain new motor vehicles with the 
appropriate specifications needed for cross-border sales constitutes a particular 
example of indirect restrictions on parallel trade32. In those specific 
circumstances, the benefit of the block exemption may depend on whether a 
supplier provides its distributors with motor vehicles with specifications identical 
                                                 
27
 Addition made by the authors. 
28
 Judgment in Cases 96-102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82, para 6. 
29
 Judgment in Case 319/82, para 6. 
30
 Such principles are also to be found in the Community rules governing the application of Article 
81 EC to distribution agreements [already Article 101 of the Treaty]. 
31
 See Court’s decision, para. 68.  
32
 O.J. C138, 28.05.2010, para. 50. 
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to those sold in other Member States for sale to consumers from those countries 
(the so-called "availability clause")33.  
3. Distribution of new motor vehicles: point of 
combination of the two Block Exemptions (330/2010 
& 461/2010) 
It could be said that the two Block Exemptions, ie 330/2010 and 461/2010, are 
actually combined; According to recital 10 of the preamble of the BER 461/2010, 
as regards the distribution of new motor vehicles34, there are not any more 
significant competition shortcomings which would distinguish this sector from 
other economic sectors (such as vertical relations) “and which could require the 
application of rules different from and stricter than those set out in Regulation 
(EU) No 330/2010”.  
The market-share threshold, the non-exemption of certain vertical agreements and 
the other conditions laid down in Regulation 330/2010 normally ensure that 
vertical agreements for the distribution of new motor vehicles comply with the 
requirements of Article 101(3) of the Treaty. Therefore, the vertical agreements 
for the distribution of new motor vehicles ought to benefit from the exemption 
granted by Regulation (EU) No 330/2010, subject to all the conditions laid down 
therein.  
Furthermore, since the settled case law about the protection of parallel trade 
concerns basically the distribution of new motor vehicles, it is obvious that the 
protection of parallel imports or exports –either it concerns vertical agreements in 
the new motor vehicles sector or vertical agreements in an other sector – it is (and 
                                                 
33
 Joined Cases 25 and 26/84. 
34
 See the conclusions of the in-depth monitoring of the motor vehicle sector set out in the 
Evaluation Report on the operation of Commission Regulation O.J. C138, 28.05.2010 and the 
Commission Communication on The Future Competition Law Framework applicable to the Motor 
Vehicle sector of 22 July 2009 [COM(2009) 388]. 
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should be) the same: it is about a hardcore restriction, consequently per se 
approach. 
4. Administrative anticompetitive measures - 
measures of having equivalent effect 
Nevertheless, in some cases it is a member-state (and not the manufacturer of a 
motor vehicle or a producer generally) which creates an indirect restriction on 
parallel trade or influences negatively the parallel trade by specific administrative 
means; it is about the case of measures having equivalent effect. For instance, as 
far as it concerns the sector of motor vehicles, the ECJ in its recent decision 
170/0735 (Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Poland) 
declared that, by subjecting imported second-hand vehicles registered in other 
Member States to a roadworthiness test prior to their registration in Poland, 
whereas domestic vehicles with the same characteristics are not subject to such a 
requirement, the Republic of Poland had failed to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 28 EC (already Article 34).  
It is estimated that the ratio of the above mentioned decision of the ECJ adds up 
to its decision C-154/85 (Commission of the European Communities v Italian 
Republic)36, where the ECJ ruled that article 30 (then 28 and already 34) of the 
Treaty, prohibiting measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, 
is infringed by an increase by a member state (Italy) in the number of 
administrative requirements involving the production of documents necessary for 
parallel imports of vehicles, whether new or already registered, from other 
member states.  
                                                 
35
 OJ C 183, 4.8.2007. The case concerns second hand vehicles. 
36
 [1987] ECR 02717. 
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Those requirements, which make registration of the vehicles more complicated, 
longer and most costly, cannot be justified on grounds of public policy connected 
with the detection or prevention of dealing in stolen vehicles37, since they cannot 
be regarded as necessary for that purpose (principle of proportionality). That is the 
case when the information required duplicates that supplied by the authorities of 
the exporting member state and less restrictive measures would be sufficient to 
achieve the desired objective. In reality, it was about an unacceptable distinction 
between domestic and imported goods (motor vehicles).  
5. The Greek example: the sector of detergents for 
domestic use 
5.1. National Law and competitive environment 
According to the national regulatory framework which rules the sector of 
detergents for domestic use in Greece, a Greek wholesaler who intends to make 
parallel imports concerning detergents, he is obliged to visit the importer asking 
for the specific content of each detergent in centigrams. In special 
circumstances38, he has to deposit all the necessary documents to the State’s 
General Chemical Laboratory (or for instance to the Supreme Chemical Council) 
in order to be licensed for the imported detergents. It is obvious that under these 
strict circumstances the ‘legal’ parallel imports of detergents for domestic use in 
Greece are practically almost impossible. National legal framework for the 
parallel imports in the specific sector is extremely strict, perhaps the most 
rigorous in the E.U.39.  
                                                 
37
 See para. 14 of the Court’s decision.  
38
 i.e. the importer denies to ‘satisfy’ the Greek wholesaler’s demand. 
39
 Probably, this is the reason why the Greek market mainly in the sector of detergents for 
domestic use is one of the most expensive (or maybe the most expensive) in the E.U. 
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Therefore, the sector of detergents for domestic use in Greece constitutes an 
oligopolistic market where only a small number of firms are activated, because of 
the existence of measures having equivalent effect and the concentrations that 
have taken place40. These activated firms have the possibility to raise their profit 
margin in upper levels, due to the absence of competition in the specific market41.  
5.2 The nature of competitive restraints 
The Greek example of parallel imports prohibition concerns vertical restrictions 
imposed in distribution agreements. There are an upstream and a downstream 
market in which firms in both markets (sellers42 in upstream market and buyers43 
in downstream market) behave in an oligopolistic way.  In the upstream market 
there are few but large producers/sellers of final goods whereas in the 
downstream market there are firms/buyers that sell the upstream firms’ products 
to the final consumers (domestic costumers of the buyers).  
Especially, the upstream market involves the production and distribution of daily 
consumer goods to retailers44, such as detergents for domestic use. Upstream 
producers may also export the products in different geographical downstream 
product markets. Each producer specialises in individual products or product 
                                                 
40
 See Fotis, P., Polemis, M., Zevgolis, N., (2011), p. 76-77 for a review of major concentrations 
that have been cleared by Hellenic Competition Commission during the period from 1995 to 2010. 
Also, see Fotis, P., Polemis, M., Zevgolis, N., (2009), p. 219-222 and Fotis P., Polemis M., (2011) 
for a financial and statistical analysis of concentrations in Greece respectively during the same 
period. In Fotis P., Polemis M., (2011) there is a review of the use in economic tools in merger 
analysis.    
41
 See Zevgolis N. and Fotis P., (2009), p. 1184-1190. According to the paper, the clause of 
prohibition of parallel imports constitutes a hardcore restriction of competition, since, ceteris 
paribus, it consists of a barrier to entry for potential competitors. By prohibiting the supply of 
products of a significant brand name by cheaper sources of supply, the clause has as its indirect (if 
not direct) object the maintenance of a minimum level of supply prices and resale prices of the 
specific products. As far as it concerns the Greek geographical market, the clause of prohibition of 
parallel imports aggravates the already restrictive national regulatory framework which rules the 
sector of detergents for domestic use, having as its result the restriction –if not the disappearance- 
of parallel imports of the specific products. 
42
 Sellers, wholesalers and producers are used interchangeably. 
43
 Supermarkets and buyers are used interchangeably.  
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groups, such as fresh products, or dry food or non-food products (i.e. detergents). 
Therefore, the latter are grouped into small segmentations each of one constitutes 
an individual product market, both from the demand and the supply side. In each 
product market a producer45 may hold a dominant position of economic strength 
or it is assumed to be the leader of the market46.  
In the downstream market the firms are not export oriented. That is, they 
distribute the products to the domestic final consumers. Therefore, the clause of 
prohibition of parallel imports includes both imports (directly) and exports 
(indirectly). The downstream firms provide a basket of foodstuffs and non-food 
household consumables sold in a supermarket environment47. Figure 1 illustrates 
the abovementioned vertical markets. 
 
Fig. 1 The Upstream & Downstream markets of daily consumer goods 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
44
 A small fraction of the upstream sales are sold to downstream wholesalers. Since that fraction of 
upstream sales consists of less than 10% of the total sales in the downstream market, in the 
remainder of the paper will assume that retailers are the only buyers of the upstream sales. 
45
 The same producer or different producers in each product market.  
46
 Stackelberg product market whereas the other firms of the product market are assumed to be the 
followers.  
47
 See, inter alia, case no IV/M.1612 and footnote 1 therein. 
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The clause of parallel imports prohibition creates barriers to entry for potential 
competitors in the upstream market. The latter leads, ceteris paribus, to a 
restriction of competition in this market. Potential competitors with easy and 
effective entry in the upstream market may possibly prevent an already active 
firm in the upstream market from increasing the selling price of the final product 
to the supermarkets48. 
Also, the decrease (diminution) of competition intention by the mean of such a 
clause enforces the already powerful existence of upstream firms (sellers) with 
strong trademarks, driving to a segmentation of the specific market in comparison 
with the rest of the national markets in the E.U. The prohibition of parallel 
imports creates almost automatically more available space for the already existing 
firms in the upstream market, active in the specific market, to raise or at least 
stabilize their market shares and consequently to enforce their market power in 
the national market.  
5.3 A practical example 
5.3.1 The Nature of Competition in the upstream & downstream 
markets 
In the downstream market a supermarket (buyer) may prefer to import the final 
good from different European geographic markets and takes advantage of price 
differentials between them49. The scope of this strategy is to increase the 
supermarket’s market share via a decreased selling price of the final good50.  
However, if all the supermarkets exercise the same strategy, the effect on each 
supermarket’s market share and consequently on its profits, depends on the 
                                                 
48
 Motta M., (2009), p. 104. 
49
 For an example of that see O.J. C138, 28.05.2010, para. 48. 
50
 The supermarket will not increase the price of the final good in the future since that will give the 
opportunity to the other supermarkets to enjoy increased profits (free – rider problem). 
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juncture where the strategy takes place. Generally speaking, whether each 
supermarket cannot foresee competitor’s counteraction, it is possible to 
overestimate the potential gaining from the abovementioned strategy.  
Additionally, the pursuit of the same strategy for a long period of time by all 
supermarkets, may lead in a ‘war of attrition’. This refers to a situation where the 
object of firms in a product market is to induce the competitors to give up and, 
consequently, to suffer economic losses in the short - run until their rivals exit the 
market. In such an environment, firms try to abstain closing plants and giving up 
market shares as thereby they would increase their costs51. This situation in game 
theory is referred to as a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’52.  
In the upstream market, the producers of the final good get the point that 
downstream firms would not preferred to engage in a ‘price war’ since that may 
ultimately eliminate their profits. At the same time, they realize that a potential 
explicit or tacit collusive behavior from the supermarkets may cut down their 
profits, especially in the case where the upstream market “behaves” competitively. 
Therefore, upstream firms will try to eliminate the possibility of the 
aforementioned behavior by imposing vertical restrictions in distribution 
agreements. Such a policy smuggles away the risk of anticompetitive practices by 
the downstream firms and ensures the upstream firm’s profits in upper normal 
levels. The final goal of strategic interaction between upstream & downstream 
firms is to enhance the ‘producer welfare’ without considering the probable 
reduction of ‘consumer welfare’ via high prices of final goods.  
                                                 
51
 Sectors characterized by increasing returns to scale and/or large costs of exit in case of high 
fixed or sunk costs are among the fundamental examples in which a ‘war of attrition’ may take 
place.  
52
 See J. Tirole (1998), p. 425-426. 
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The downstream firms recognize the increased strategic power of the upstream 
firms with respect to their ability to bargain better terms in distribution 
agreements. They also realize that eventually, the cooperation with the sellers will 
reach a settlement which increases their profits. 
5.3.2 A repeated game among sellers of detergents for domestic use 
and supermarkets 
Both producers and supermarkets prefer to cooperate rather than to engage in a 
«war of attrition». Also, both of them are patients, that is, they prefer to get the 
profits which accrue from the long – run time span, rather than to get the short – 
run returns and they communicate in frequently temporal periods. Therefore, if 
supermarkets choose not to cooperate with upstream producers, the short – run 
payoff is less than the long – run profits. 
Additionally, an upstream seller will eventually realize whether a supermarket 
strives to cheat by choosing not to cooperate while, the profits from cheating are 
less than the cost of cheating.  
Table 1 represents the normal form of the one – shoot game matrix among sellers 
and buyers.  
 
Table 1 One – Shoot game among producers (sellers) and supermarkets (buyers) 
 
 
Buyer (supermarket) 
Seller (producer) 
Strategies CHEAT NO CHEAT 
NO COOPERATION 25, 25 50, 0 
COOPERATION 0, 50 40, 40 
Payoffs in mil. Euro 
Cheat/No Cheat: imports/no imports of final good from different geographical areas 
Cooperation/No cooperation: distribution agreement/no distribution agreement which 
prohibits imports of final good from a different geographical areas 
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The payoffs of both of them are their profits53.  The consumer welfare increases as 
soon as all the other supermarkets in the downstream market do not follow the 
same strategy. The Nash – equilibrium of the static game reveals that the selling 
price of the final good remains low since each player simultaneously maximizes 
its profit by choosing the dominated Nash equilibrium.  
The dominated strategy for supermarkets is cheat and the equivalent dominated 
strategy for producers is no cooperation (25>1 & 50>40)54. The static game 
results in a dominated Nash – equilibrium even though both players may increase 
their profits by ‘communicating’ between each other (the payoffs for both players 
are 40). However, if all the supermarkets follow to cheat, that will trigger a war 
price among each other which eventually results in profit losses. Although this is 
the best scenario for the consumers, firms in both levels of vertical chain realize 
that the best for them is not to independently choose their strategies. 
Suppose now that upstream & downstream firms communicate in frequently 
temporal periods. That is, the game is repeated in the near future. We assume that 
the static game of complete information is repeated infinitely, with the results of 
all previous periods observed before the current period begins. That is, for each t  
period the results for each 1−t  preceding periods of the game are observed before 
the tht  period begins. In our example the periods cover different distribution 
agreements among producers and supermarkets. The results of the distribution 
agreements are known to both them before the new period begins. 
                                                 
53
 The lower the selling price of the final good, the higher the market penetration and hence the 
profits of an individual supermarket. 
54
 The first column presents the producer’s payoff and the second column presents the 
supermarkets’ payoff.    
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We denote ( )
( )r
p
+
−
=
1
1
δ  the discount factor55 of producers and supermarkets where 
 is the probability that the game will end immediately after a period and  
is the probability that the game continues at least one more period. The payoffs 
for each chosen set of strategy by upstream & downstream firms are given by the 
2X2 game matrix in Table 1. 
The present value of the infinite sequence of payoffs nt ,......,3,2,1=  is given by 
t
i
t payoffpayoffpayoffpayoff ∑
∞
=
−=+++
1
1
3
2
21 .........  δδδ    (1) 
Equation (1) reflects both the time value of money & the probability the game will 
end. The payoff  to be received in the next period and two periods from now is 
worth ( )
( )r
payoffp
+
−
1
1
 and ( )
( )r
payoffp
+
−
1
1 2
respectively. 
Following payoffs in Table 1 we argue that cooperation among producers and 
supermarkets may occur in every period of distribution agreements (or, 
cooperation may occur in every period of a subgame perfect outcome of the 
infinitely repeated game) if both sides from the vertical chain commit from the 
outset that they choose the high payoff equilibrium (cooperation). Otherwise, they 
will choose the low payoff equilibrium (cheat) in the subsequent periods56. 
Upstream firms will cooperate with downstream firms if the latter do not import 
the final good from different European geographical areas. Downstream firms 
prefer not to import the final good since the profits from cooperation are higher 
than the profits from cheating. 
                                                 
55
 The value today of a euro to be received one period later, where  is the interest rate per period.  
56
 This strategy is called trigger strategy.  
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A supermarket cooperates if 57. According to figure 2, the straight 
distance AB depicts a lump sum payoff of a supermarket after cheating and the 
distance ΒΓ shows the reduction of supermarket’s payoff if an upstream producer 
decides to follow the trigger strategy. A supermarket cheats whether Γ> BAB and 
cooperates if the distance AΓ is higher than the distance ΒΓ (that is, AB>ΒΓ ).  
Figure 2 depicts the payoffs of the infinitely repeated game among producers and 
supermarkets according to the aforementioned trigger strategy.  
 
Fig. 2 Payoffs of the infinitely repeated game among producers (sellers) and 
supermarkets (buyers) 
 
 
     50 
      
     40                                                                                                 
                                               Payoffs 
     25 
 
 
 
 
Following cooperation, the price of the final goods remains in upper normal 
levels. Supermarkets do not cheat (import the final good) and therefore the 
consumer welfare decreases.  
                                                 
57
 The infinite payoff when a supermarket cheats or cooperates is   or   
correspondingly. A supermarket cooperates if     or  . 
Periods of distribution agreements 
A 
B 
Γ 
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6. Concluding remarks 
The main question which this paper tries to answer is whether prohibition of 
parallel imports constitutes a hardcore restriction of Block Exception Regulation 
for vertical agreements, that is, a per se approach. 
Firstly, it is mentioned that in downstream markets where firms are not export 
oriented, the clause of prohibition of parallel imports coincide with that of 
prohibition of parallel trade (both imports and exports). 
Secondly, the answer to the abovementioned question is yes. The prohibition of 
parallel imports is a measure which reduces the buyer’s incentive to decline resale 
price by diminishing the sources of supply and consequently, raises dangerously 
the selling prices and reduces the consumer welfare. It is also an exclusive supply 
of a specific trademark by itself (exclusive source of supply), which prevents the 
retailer/buyer from finding products of the same trademark in lower prices by 
other sources. 
Above all, it constitutes an important anti-competitive objective for the internal 
market since it prevents consumers to purchase products in other Member States 
and take advantage of price differentials between them.  
The abovementioned conclusions further enhanced at least in some cases by the 
structure of the market and the national law of the member state (measures of 
having equivalent effect constitute an indicative example) where the prohibition 
of parallel imports takes place. In vertical situations where both in upstream and 
downstream markets firms (sellers in upstream market and buyers in downstream 
market) behave in an oligopolistic way, free trade may be restricted more than in 
markets where the probability of cooperation among buyers and sellers may not 
be achieved in practice.  
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7. Policy implications 
Competition authorities of member states may be more skeptical in situations 
where a clause of prohibition of parallel imports is imposed via distribution 
agreements. An in depth analysis of legal framework and case law in combination 
with the market structure and the nature of completion therein, may lead to the 
approach that eventually, parallel trade is prohibited, even though parallel exports 
are not directly prohibited.   
An intervention by competition authorities in markets where the prohibition of 
parallel imports takes place, especially in sectors where entry by potential 
competitors is not easy, may prevent upstream firms to follow the same strategy in 
the future (Threat – Based Competition, Acutt & Elliott 2001). 
Policy makers of European Law especially by means of regulation for vertical 
agreements and concerted practices, should consider more clearly (i.e. explicitly) 
the parallel trade prohibition into the hard core restrictions of Block Exception 
Regulations or at least to define a hard core list of circumstances under which it 
should be considered as a hard core restriction.   
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